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A B S T R A C T
The conceptual framework of evolutionary governance theory (EGT) is deployed and extended to rethink the
idea of coastal governance and the possibilities of a coastal governance better adapted to challenges of climate
change and intensified use of both land and sea. ‘The coastal condition’ is analysed as a situation where par-
ticular modes of observation and coordination were possible and necessary, and those observations (and derived
calculations of risk and opportunity) are valuable for the governance of both land and sea. An argument is
constructed for a separate arena for coastal governance, without erasing the internal logic of pre-existing gov-
ernance for land and sea. This entails that coastal governance is destined to be a place of (productive) conflict, as
much as of policy integration. Policy integration will be more difficult and more important in coastal govern-
ance, as this is an arena where the effects of many land based activities and activities at sea become visible and
entangled. Policy integration in coastal governance does, however, require deep knowledge of the governance
path and existing forms of integration there (e.g. in planning), and it exists in an uneasy tension with the
requirements of adaptive governance. This tension further contributes to the complexity and complex-prone
character of coastal governance. Neither complexity nor conflict can be avoided, and coastal governance as an
image of balanced decision-making is (positively) presented as a productive fiction.
1. Foreword
This is the first article in a special issue on governance for land-sea
interactions. It is intended as a ‘framing paper’, a paper which presents
the general perspective on governance for land-sea interactions. The
issue and the paper have an analytic and normative aspect. The nor-
mative side is a plea for policy attention to coastal areas, and more
specifically a set of arguments for coastal governance, for the delinea-
tion and governance of a zone spanning land and sea. Why and how this
is to be done, emerges from the analytic angle, where the paper and the
special issue deploy and develop the perspective of evolutionary gov-
ernance theory (EGT), a perspective on governance which places gov-
ernance in the context of social-ecological systems and which under-
stands governance and governance transformation against the
background of co-evolutions of all constituent parts of governance:
actors, institutions, power, knowledge and narrative.
This paper therefore aims to give a broad picture, yet a new picture,
of coasts, and especially coastal communities, reinterpreted through the
lens of EGT. Other papers in the issues locate themselves against this
background, expand the landscape, give more detail, and find their own
balance between normative and analytic angles. The new picture
emerging in this framing paper is already a validation of the perspec-
tive, yet this is not enough. The new understanding of what will be
called ‘the coastal condition’ is a stepping stone for a new reflection on
improved modes of governance for that newly understood condition.
It's not a disease, but it is a state of affairs which embodies both un-
foreseen problems and unexpected ways out of bigger, i.e. not merely
coastal, problems. Many of the problems and solutions emerging out of
a coastal EGT perspective will reappear in the other papers, yet in this
framing paper, the argument is laid out for the value of the perspective,
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before additional forms of validation, and new insights, emerge in the
other papers.
The nature of this enterprise thus necessitates some broad strokes
here and there, some unfamiliar technicality elsewhere. The broad
strokes are part of the effort at reinterpretation of a large issue, and the
technicality comes with the relative novelty of EGT. Thus, arguments
are first presented for a rethinking of coastal management and gov-
ernance, then arguments for adopting an EGT perspective, and this is
followed by an introduction of selected and partly adapted concepts
from that theory. Next the reasoning is enriched by harking back to the
(mostly European) experiences with ICZM, or integrated coastal zone
management, an earlier form of emphatically coastal governance,
linking social and ecological systems, aiming at ambitious policy in-
tegration. The very limited success of such endeavour seemingly similar
to what is proposed in this paper, prompts both a critique of ICZM and a
further refining of our conceptual tools and practical recommendations.
The subsequent analysis of the ‘coastal condition’ then enables us to
discern both governance gaps and possible solutions to them.
2. Introduction
The coast is, in its very basic sense, a place of contact and intensified
interaction, between ecosystems, between groups of people, trade
flows, bacteria, and epistemic lenses onto the world. It is these diverse
forms of interaction that together define the terrestrial-marine
boundary scape: the coast. Besides, the interaction of tangible entities,
the interaction, cross-fertilisation and distinct separation of different
modes of organising, decision-making, of governance play out along the
coast, challenged by population density, shifting materialities and
weak, partly outdated or little enforced governance mechanisms.
Indeed, the distinction between governance and government has been
made and remade naturally in coastal environments, as coasts often
represent borders of political entities. Polities can focus on the sea, or
turn their back to it, but can never ignore the, in times of rapid en-
vironmental change, decreasingly reliable boundary between land and
sea. Coasts are therefore places of institutional rupture and consecutive
co-evolution.
The (co-)evolution of formal/informal institutions for the governing
of coastal waters and lands, as well as the mechanisms and organisa-
tional bodies enforcing them, relate to the overarching topic of ocean
governance, internationally identified as one of the key environmental
and development challenges of the 21st century. To date, the interna-
tional ocean governance system is based on the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Legal responsibility and
right to safeguard, exploit and in general govern coastal waters (12 nm
off the coast) here clearly lies with the nation states. However, diverse
coalitions of regional and global actors argue that the prevailing gov-
ernance framework, including the diversity of instruments and en-
forcement mechanisms employed by nation states, are insufficient to
ensure the sustainable use of coastal and marine resources, and to
safeguard the global commons for human wellbeing and intergenera-
tional equity [1]. In addition, more recent developments along global
coasts, steadily increasing population pressure, expanding tourism in-
dustries, but also increased risks resulting from climate change inducing
more frequent storm surges and sea-level changes, further challenge the
governance mechanisms and the need for regionally, cross-border co-
ordinated efforts. Both looking from land and sea, the coast thus re-
presents not only a boundary but a liminal space where the effects in
two directions are not easily grasped.
2.1. A new focus on marine governance reveals the importance of the coast
The discussions towards more integrated coastal governance mark a
relatively recent shift in policy discourse [2]. Whilst substantially more
knowledge and experience in the governance of land-based/terrestrial
socio-environmental systems have been amassed over centuries, the
regulation of marine and coastal systems - combined with related an-
thropogenic activity - remains a more recent phenomenon. To this end,
there is much debate among scientific and policy circles on effective
policy mixes and regulatory instruments that facilitate integrated forms
of multi-scalar and cross-sectoral governance across ecologically di-
verse marine spaces [3,4].
Therefore, in order to safeguard and achieve the sustainable use of
coastlines, future ocean governance frameworks are faced with a two-
directional challenge. The first is to integrate a range of crosscutting
local, regional and global concerns, often associated with unsustainable
production and consumption practices, an increasing world population
in the face of planetary resource boundaries (the UN predicts a world
population of 9billion in 2050), the weakening resilience of natural
ecosystems, combined with anthropogenic climate change and varia-
bility. The second challenge rests on how to address the complexity of
an already overburdened and fragmented ocean governance system,
especially with emerging developments such as deep-sea mining, and
more remote and environmentally sensitive areas such as the Arctic
being accessed for new activities. The questions coastlines pose to
governance on land are similarly complex: many things which happen
at several places on land have effects on the coast, while the coastlines
themselves are under pressure of competing land uses [5]. The issue of
scale is also visible on the land side.
At a regional level, Europe for instance is witnessing a shift towards
a transformative policy approach in the way our oceans, seas and
coastlines are managed. To enable the flourishing of a Blue Economy
while protecting natural resources and safeguarding sustainable liveli-
hoods, a more inclusive, nuanced and context-specific governance ap-
proach of oceans and coasts has been assessed as being necessary (Joint
Communication of EU Commission, Council & Parliament 2016/49,
Commission Implementation Decision 2014/1447; COM, 2012/494
final; COM, 2014/86 final). Consequently, the European Commission
has embarked on a consultative process to consider how best to
strengthen policy coherence and comprehensiveness on improving its
marine international governance framework (European Commission,
2015). Among these are the more recent shifts towards international
ocean governance (“016/49), a new marine spatial planning approach
(Council Directive 2014/89/EU) and the Marine Knowledge 2020 in-
itiative (European Union Maritime Affairs, 2012).
These steps on the European level are accompanied by a rapidly
transforming post-2015 Development Agenda as well as ongoing dia-
logues of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on the one side
and the uprise of nationalistic populism in many parts of Europe and
the United States, on the other side leading to the renegotiation of the
terms of international cooperation. The universal set of Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), combined with climate action, have re-
vitalised debates ranging from the primacy of Blue Carbon and the
sustainable use of marine biodiversity in the Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction (ABNJ) Programme, to the development of international
exploitation rules for deep-sea minerals within the aegis of the
International Seabed Authority (ISA), as well as territorial disputes as
exemplified in the South China Sea. The ocean thus increasingly be-
comes object of territorial disputes – in some cases linked to nationalist
reasoning.
Looking from the land towards the sea, the multiplication of
boundaries one often finds on coast lines, as well as the wide diversity
of networks, from local to global, which use the coast as base, pose very
similar issues of policy coordination and integration. What makes the
challenge for actors in land-based governance harder is that they often
do not observe the effects of their activities and (lack of) coordination
on the marine environment. And that few marine areas have the same
density of (de facto) governance systems and layers as the coastal land
regions, since that's where most people live and work, including the
decision-makers on the sea.
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2.2. Governance challenges amplified: arguments for Evolutionary
Governance Theory (EGT)
A challenge to all these regional and global discussions is the bal-
ance between global and trans-regional perspectives, and on the other
hand local-level governance capacities for their implementation.
Despite the existence of excellent marine sciences in Europe for instance
[6], scientific organisation and expertise representation on oceanic and
coastal governance and the expertise-based, while politically and so-
cietally viable transformation of ocean and coastal governance regimes
remains a challenge [7,8].
From these initial observations on the current challenges facing
coastal areas, and the demands on coastal governance, one can distill
three areas of concern:
– The recognition of the coast as an area by itself, more than a
boundary
– The difficulty of observation in governance in two directions, be-
tween land and sea
– The difficulty of policy coordination and integration, on land, at sea,
between land and sea
It is this situation that encourages the authors of this contribution to
reflect on coastal governance and its challenges ahead out of an evo-
lutionary governance theory (EGT) inspired perspective. The aim is to
(a) contribute to a better understanding of the current coastal chal-
lenges at hand by reflecting them through the conceptual lens that EGT
offers; as well as (b) to advance EGT as a conceptual tool for assessing
governance challenges in motion with reference to marine and coastal
conditions.
Evolutionary governance theory (EGT) offers a framework which
leaned initially on social systems theory, post-structuralism, and in-
stitutional economics, but which recently has been expanded to account
more fully the roles of materiality, of the co-evolutions of social and
ecological systems [9]. EGT has not been applied yet to the analysis of
coastal governance, the aim of the special issue, this paper is embedded
in. In the following sections, a selection of key concepts from the theory
is presented, selected with the vantage point of coastal analysis, and
with the aim of building on the theory as much as applying it.
EGT pays special attention to the roles of knowledge and narrative
in governance, and the links between the formation of discursive ob-
jects (such as ‘the coast’) and the evolution of organisational forms. For
EGT, new observations can lead to new objects, from there to new
problem definitions and possible solutions. Most likely, new linkages
between existing policies and policy domains have to be formed, and
EGT can shed a light there on both the need and the limits of reform and
integration. For those reasons, EGT looked promising for a re-descrip-
tion of coastal governance.
Our aim is a re-interpretation of what makes coastal areas unique, a
uniqueness which is called here the coastal condition, and which will be
translated into governance terms. The main reason for this is our view
that an interpretation of the coastal condition in EGT terms can open
the door for a re-interpretation of problems of policy and planning for
coastal areas, where EGT can shed a light on new modes of adaptation
to changing circumstances, and on the limits of adaptation and in-
stitutional design to deal with emerging issues - declarations of the need
for new organisations, plans, policies. A co-evolutionary view of coastal
communities and their governance can bring us a step closer to solu-
tions for pressing problems across the world. It can discern which so-
lutions are more promising than others, and which promises to believe
more than others, when looking at practical suggestions on governing
the coast [2]. It is that promise which will be articulated and argued in
the following paragraphs.
In the next sections, first, a selection of EGT concepts is introduced,
after which a reflection on earlier solutions to coastal management is
presented, in particular the experiences with Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM). After this, a new image of the coastal condition is
built, leaning on EGT, and the problems encountered by ICZM. Then,
possible roads towards coastal governance are considered which can be
better adapted to current problems, more adaptive overall. EGT sees
problems and solutions differently, and discerns also boundaries in the
pursuit of particular solutions.
3. Evolutionary governance: Mutual interdependence of the
elements of governance
Evolutionary governance theory understands governance as radi-
cally evolutionary [10]. Governance, the making of and living by col-
lectively binding decisions in any community, is a processual amalgam
of the continuous, ever changing, and thus evolutionary interplay of
actors, institutions, knowledges and systems of sense-making, (natural,
technological, infrastructural) materialities and interest formations in
any community, in any location and at any point in time. All elements
are heterogeneous in themselves. Different actor groups are guided by
different belief systems or stocks of knowledge, confirm or contest a
particular set of institutions, while establishing new ones, adapting to
changed materialities (due to technological advances or environmental
change processes etc.) or fostering exactly the change processes that
alter the given materialities.
3.1. The elements
One is thus confronted by a continuous interplay of not only a range
of different elements, or types, crucial in any governance process, but
furthermore by the interplay of these very diverse forms of each ele-
ment, thus sub-types. The often drawn distinction between ‘the formal’
(often associated with the state and the doing of its legislative body)
and ‘the informal’ (often associated with non-state, civil society, ‘on the
ground’ systems of cognitive and institutional orders) spheres of gov-
ernance offers another level of analytically sorting these elements
constitutive to governance processes. Empirically nevertheless ‘the
formal’ does not exist without the constant interplay with the informal
[10,11]. Instead, also formal & informal are inseparably tied to each
other – not as distinctly separate binaries, but as interdependently
linked, two sides of the same coin.
Natural resources governance in general, and marine and coastal
resource governance in particular, empirically illustrate this and
therefore have to be understood as an interdependently linked interplay
of
(a) its constituting elements and types, namely actors, institutions,
knowledges, materialities and strategic interests;
(b) their heterogeneous sub-types, namely the diverse actor groups
involved, the diverse, possibly competing, mutually undermining or
reaffirming, institutional frameworks, diverse stocks of knowledge,
systems of sense-making and their respective degrees of epistemic
authorities, the diverse coastal, marine, terrestrial, hard infra-
structural or technological materialities, as well as strategic, eco-
nomic, political or social interests; and
(c) the different formal, informal and in-between institutional levels
acting as framework conditions
It thus becomes important to acknowledge contingency as a key
aspect of governance evolution, in the sense that the next step in the
evolution of a governance system, and hence the result of many steps, is
a possible but not necessary outcome [12]. The more actors and in-
stitutions co-evolve, the more rigidities, i.e. constraints, but also po-
tentials for co-evolution, arise. The recognition of contingency is not a
trivial matter, as it points out that, neither in the effects of problems,
nor in the search for governance solutions, one can expect enough si-
milarity of conditions to allow for one size fits all analyses [13].
When considering coupled social-ecological systems of coastal
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communities, the EGT concept of dependencies looms large. EGT dis-
tinguishes between path dependencies, interdependencies and goal
dependencies, together making up the rigidity in contingent govern-
ance paths. Flexibility stems from the interplay between the different
dependencies, from creative choice in the process, and from unexpected
events in social or ecological environments.
3.2. Dependencies
Path dependencies are legacies from the past which influence the
current reproduction of governance. These dependencies can have
many forms, as has been recognized in economics, political science and
other disciplines. For current purposes, and inspired by earlier analyses,
one can distinguish here between cognitive, organizational and mate-
rial path dependencies [14]:
– Cognitive path dependencies are a matter of concepts, narratives,
ideologies inherited from previous states of the governance system,
either through actors believing in them, or through embedding in
policies, plans, laws, and in informal institutions. They are a con-
servative manifestation of power/knowledge, where the knowledge
is not always susceptible to manipulation by actors, where the
stories embedded in governance exert their hold over actors and
their interactions to a degree they can never be fully aware of.
– Organisational path dependencies are referred to as the legacies im-
bued by inherited actors and institutions: the previous inclusion/
exclusion of actors, the previous choice for this or that institution as
tool of coordination shapes what can happen next.
– Finally, material path dependencies stem from both natural, techno-
logical and cultural factors, from features of natural systems (rough
coastlines), social systems (producing, for example, concrete or
nature based coastal protection) and from particular interactions
between social and ecological systems (say, the emphasis on mining
in a particular community).
Goal dependencies are impacts of visions for the future on the current
reproduction of governance. (The sustainable development goal 14
(Life below Water) in the United Nations Sustainable Development
Agenda 2030 would be one of those goals influencing todays’ govern-
ance decisions.) Those visions can be previous plans, directly deliber-
ating a preferable future, but also policies, laws and informal institu-
tions which implicitly rely on images of a particular future, either a
desirable or an undesirable one. Goal dependencies can be the various
effects of goals in the narrow sense (as targets), but, more commonly,
the effects of previous choices hoping to bring a preferred future closer.
A plan e.g. might have targeted more sustainable fisheries, but might
have produced the opposite effect, for a variety of reasons described by
others in the policy literatures [15,16]. One can refer to the goal set by
the Convention of Biological Diversity to protect 10% of coastal marine
areas by 2020. No matter if the goal is reached or not, many of the parks
will be ineffective paper parks and there is a discussion about the
sometimes competing goals of nature conservation and human well-
being [17]. Translated in terms of environmental feedbacks, Valentinov
(2015) [18] would argue, and this paper concurs, that negative feed-
back from the environment (e.g. ‘the plan doesn’t work’) can cause a
reorientation (a second order goal dependency) yet this does not ex-
clude further unobserved effects of subsequent decisions in the en-
vironment.
Finally, interdependencies are dependencies in the present, between
actors and institutions, between actors, and between institutions. A
policy relies on a law to have an effect, an NGO depends on a University
to make its argument, a plan relies on key actors for its implementation
(or formation). In a broader social-ecological systems perspective, a
perspective needed to analyse the coastal condition, one has to add
interdependencies between social and ecological systems: elements and
features of ecological systems become natural resources in a particular
interplay with social systems, their mode of organisation, or, on the
contrary, obstacles, problems, limits to development [19].
3.3. Co-evolution and system creation
All three dependencies play out at the same time and influence each
other. Interdependencies right now are shaped by a variety of path
dependencies, while they create new path dependencies. Path de-
pendencies and interdependencies shape goal dependencies, while goal
dependencies can only be understood as properties of the whole gov-
ernance system, including its path and interdependencies. The effects of
an existing future-oriented policy on current governance, or a dis-
cursive frame such as the UN Sustainable Development Agenda 2030,
can only be explained by taking into account how actors and institu-
tions relate right now, and to what extent they reproduce older con-
figurations of ideas, of actors, of institutions, revolutionize or develop
these further.
The three dependencies, seen through the lens of social systems
theory, in particular Nikolas Luhmann's theory [20], can also be ana-
lysed in their system-building effects. If one sees coastal communities as
marked by different dependencies, internally, and with their ecological
environment (see below ‘Coastal condition’), then the dependencies of
evolving governance can be seen as shaping all systems involved, and
reducing the unpredictability in the behaviour of all for all. Local or-
ganisations are formed as social systems form, as social systems, en-
dowed with knowledge and coordinative capacity to work in the
boundary-spanning environment of the coast, and allowing to couple
politics, economy and law in a localised way [21].
Actors are formed by power/knowledge interactions and they alter
power/knowledge relations through their actions, e.g. their use, inter-
pretation and creation of institutions. Power/knowledge, for Foucault
and in EGT, is the material for strategy, yet the strategist can never
escape from power/knowledge [9]. He or she uses self-definitions and
views of others associated with discourses which then whisper strate-
gies, inspire to see problems and solutions, hint at the inclusion of
particular narratives in governance, at the exclusion of particular forms
of expertise, e.g. by dismissing them as folklore or irrelevant or as used
for mere manipulation by other actors [22]. Narratives, knowledge and
expertise are all considered knowledge in this view, with different
forms of knowledge underpinning, producing and conditioning
others [23]. In governance, where competition between understandings
of the world is the name of the game, knowledges necessarily entangle,
are excluded and exclude others and other things, and this dynamic is
often utterly productive: new objects and subjects are created which
can provide common ground between actors and discourses, or am-
munition in further clashes [24].
These notions from EGT hope to enable a first articulation of the
coastal condition, to be addressed with the tools of governance.
4. Previous attempts at coastal governance: Integrated Coastal
Zone Management
There are previous attempts to look at the coast as a unit for policy-
making of course [25–28]. Countries have their own approach, some
coming in the direction advocated above, but there is the special case of
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICMZ), an approach which ex-
plicitly tries to address coastal zones as unities, and delineated areas
with a land and sea part, aiming for new forms of policy integration at
that level. A brief analysis of the experiences with ICZM can help us to
sharpen the image of the coastal condition, and start from ICZM to
move in the direction of adaptive coastal governance.
4.1. A brief genealogy of ICZM
The history of ICZM starts after the UN Earth Summit of Rio de
Janeiro in 1992. At European level, the European Council adopted two
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resolutions, in 1992 and 1994, acknowledging the challenges in coastal
zones and calling for an integrated approach for sustainable manage-
ment. Between 1996 and 1999, a Demonstration Programme, consisting
of 36 projects, was expected to provide technical information and to
stimulate debates among the various actors involved in the planning,
management or use of European coastal zones. In 2000, the
Commission adopted two documents based on the experiences of the
Demonstration Programme: a communication titled "Integrated Coastal
Zone Management: A Strategy for Europe"; and a European Parliament
and Council Recommendation concerning the implementation of ICZM
in Europe. This Recommendation was adopted by the European
Parliament and Council on 30 May 2002 (2002/413/EC) and aimed at
sustainable development based on eight common principles defining
ICZM. National ICZM strategies were called for. Exchange of knowledge
and best practices were stimulated especially under INTERREG pro-
gramme [29].
In 2006 an external evaluation of EU ICZM recommendation was
performed. The national strategies deadline was February 2006, but
none of the twenty members, plus Romania had strategies at im-
plementation stage. The evaluation confirmed (in its own eye) the va-
lidity of the ICZM principles and concluded that implementation should
further progress on the basis of the EU ICZM Recommendation [30].
The 2007 Green Paper “Towards a future maritime policy for the EU”
stayed close to the content of the 2000 communication.
On 12 March 2013 the Commission adopted a proposal for a di-
rective establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning and
integrated coastal management (Directive Proposal for MSP and ICZM,
2013). This initiative was aiming to help the implementation of several
other EU policies relevant for marine and coastal areas like the Marine
Strategy Framework Directive, the Water Framework Directive, the
Natura and Habitats Directives and the Biodiversity Strategy, the
Integrated Maritime Policy, the Strategy on Climate Change
Adaptation, the Renewable Energy Directive, the Motorways of the Sea
Initiative and the Common Fishery Policy. The proposal became a di-
rective on 23 July 2014 (MSP Directive). But the link with ICZM was
mentioned only in Article no. 6 (2), as follows: “aim to promote co-
herence between maritime spatial planning (…) and other processes,
such as integrated coastal management (or…)”.
4.2. Assessment of ICZM
Academic assessments followed in recent years [31–36]. O’Hagan
et al. [37] (this special issue) assess the implementation challenges for
land and sea, focusing on how legislation and organisations responsible
for implementation have evolved in the context of European Union
regulations envisioning either land or sea. Mazé et al. [38] examined to
what extent the implementation difficulties resulted from knowledge/
power issues at the core of interactions among multiscalar networks and
actors which are also usually tied to either land or sea. The underlying
rationalities of ICZM as a global paradigm for coastal governance were
analysed by Zinzani [39], who linked ICZM emergence and relative
weakness to unstable discursive coalitions and shifting development
paradigms.
In policy terms, it seems that the delineation of a coastal unity for
governance present in ICZM was erased in the new policies aiming at
marine spatial planning. At the same time, the level of ambition in
terms of policy integration in the new MSP approach was even higher
than in the ICZM paradigm and documents, while that policy integra-
tion very rarely took place. Little policy learning took place apparently
at the EU level. The emergence and evolution of ICZM and the more
recent move towards marine spatial planning can be understood with
an EGT lens: goals formulated in the UN Earth Summit led to the de-
velopment of ICZM. Unintended consequences (in this sense a second
order goal dependency) and interdependencies – the rather strict se-
paration of actors and institutions of land and sea – have led to a re-
orientation towards less integration between the land and the sea,
namely marine spatial planning. One can argue that a lacking under-
standing of the coastal condition is part and parcel of the problem
(together with the usual business of shifting discursive coalitions in EU
policy making). Hence the attention will be turned to EGT and its image
of that coastal condition.
5. The coastal condition
Since people cannot live in the water, and certainly not in salt
water, any coastal community is predicated on risk [40]. From that, one
can deduce, and observe, an importance of the stories and knowledges
which underpin risk calculation, which explain risks of coast and sea to
the community itself. Dealing with the coast, using the locational ad-
vantages (for trade, fishing) necessitated forms of organisation, tools of
governance otherwise not common - one can think of the development
of insurance industries in medieval Europe, co-evolving with interna-
tional trade.
5.1. Patterns of interdependence produce unique modes of observation
Interdependence asserts itself as the key dependency in coastal gov-
ernance [41]. Knowledge of the tight coupling between social and
ecological systems becomes essential in steering the community away
from danger, and enabling it to see opportunities. The behaviour of the
sea, the connection to the sea, the buffer from the sea (dunes, wet-
lands), the state of the connection inland (complementing the sea
connection, making it functional), all these things become central to
strategising in coastal communities. The interdependence between
community and environment tends to create tighter interdependencies
within the community [42]. New forms of cooperation, new specialised
roles, new tools of coordination have to arise to deal with the chal-
lenges posed by the location.
Coastal communities are constantly reminded of their place in the
social-ecological system, of the power of nature over their welfare and
prosperity [40]. They are forced to make choices early on, adapt their
governance structures and physical infrastructures to their location and
economic objectives, and these create material, organisational and,
material path dependencies. The tight relationship with the physical
environment makes for strong material path dependencies, which refers
both to direct impacts of the environment, as impacts of physical in-
frastructures which responded previously to that environment. Think of
expensive harbour infrastructure, think of highways connecting ports to
capitals, and think of costly dredging and land reclamation histories
and routines [9].
Coastal communities are situated on an edge, a social-ecological
boundary. They straddle that edge in a way never fully understood by
others [43,44]. They developed not only forms of organisation enabling
this, but also forms of observation making it possible to understand
what's happening on and under water and relating it to potential ac-
tivities and to the organisation of their settlements on land. Think of the
South Pacific, where people perceive the coral reef as their garden. The
ecological boundary can be described as a mosaic of ecosystems, ran-
ging from various types of dunes, cliffs and coastal wetlands and es-
tuaries, to the shallows, reefs and islets on the side of the water [41].
Water and land interpenetrate, also through groundwater flows, while
freshwater and saltwater create complex gradients defining a myriad of
ecosystem and vegetation types. The coast itself can be described as a
meta-ecosystem, not a border but a boundary zone, a zone of more
complex and dynamic exchanges and dependencies [3].
What looks like a hard line for many outsiders, in other words, tends
to look like a zone for insiders [44,45]. The insider observation there-
fore has a value for larger scale governance systems, with a relation to
the sea. This constitutes in our view an argument for inclusion of local
coastal perspectives in higher level governance affecting the coast, and
it is an argument for the formation of governance configurations em-
bodying the zone, rather than the boundary.
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5.2. Marginality and centrality in multi-level governance
Slow effects of human action, slow since buffered by the mass of the
sea, makes collective action rather difficult being achieved and more
immediate pressing issues are coming to the fore [46]. This makes the
experience and observation of coastal communities all the more valu-
able, while also posing limits to their observation, and a need for other
forms of knowledge (expertise), likely associated with higher level
administration, to enrich coastal governance locally. This too, forms an
argument for calling into existence arenas for coastal governance. Such
arenas can, in Luhmannian terms [20], never take away the blind spots
in the observation of environment and self, thus in the environmental
effects of local action and action elsewhere, therefore they are not a
guarantee for long term sustainability, but through institutionalising
second- order observation, it is likely that the blind spots will be re-
duced and amenable to ongoing management. Indeed, the observation
of observation (second order observation), of distinctions made by
other systems (and actors associated with or representing them) can
make a difference when managing environmental risk, and the possi-
bility for actors to play a slightly different role in a new arena can help
by further diversifying perspectives, by loosening couplings between
organisations, function systems, episodes [47].
This is all the more necessary because coastlines often come with
the additional problem of multiplication of administrative/political
boundaries, a phenomenon stemming from the need of different levels
of governance and the easy choice for the coast as a boundary (because
of the material dependencies mentioned above). In a modern nation
state, a coastal community easily sits on three political/ administrative
boundaries, linked to local, regional and national administrations.
Overlapping boundaries create more complex dependencies on the
centre [48]. The land might have regulations on the communal gov-
ernance level, plus laws which might be associated with a national
boundary or national interests. The sea is much more influenced by
national legislation [37,49]. Multi-level governance is thus a natural
given in many coastal communities, yet the coupling will differ from
the situation in other communities, with central influence asserting it-
self in more unpredictable manners, more likely to disrupt local gov-
ernance. While the social-ecological interdependency, important locally
and not fully understood centrally, will put an additional pressure on
the functioning of multi-level governance, causing locally unpredictable
behaviour in the eyes of the centre.
The marginal position on the coast simultaneously allows for more
contact with everything outside the nation state, with escape routes,
communication routes; exposure to foreignness can cast a doubt over
prevailing rules and belief systems promoted by the centre [50,51].
Places of foreign trade were not only breeding grounds of democracy
(and merchant aristocracy), but also places of hybrid beliefs, of cyni-
cism and worldly wit - ‘they’ve seen it all [52]. Which reminds us that
an overlapping of boundaries creates its own spaces of freedom (just as
complex legal systems offer a myriad of loopholes), while the relative
smooth space of the sea offers, following a Deleuzian perspective here,
the virtuality of new connections and flows, of goods, people and ideas,
a partial escape from the control mechanisms of the state [12,51].
The particular complexity of coastal communities, their boundary
and observation issues, bring particular problems with them for policy
integration. While both old issues (e.g. erosion, pollution, salinisation)
and emerging issues (sea level rise, weather variability, energy transi-
tions) make it all the more necessary.
5.3. Specific need and specific obstacles for policy integration
Full policy integration is not possible without losing the specificity
of different policy domains and spatial territories [53]. Moreover, many
institutional designs are possible when aiming at a form of policy in-
tegration, and each choice implies a prioritising of this expertise over
that, this actor over that one, this institution over another [11]. Policy
integration also has the potential to undermine checks and balances,
and to reduce flexibility and institutional experiment - therefore
adaptive capacity [54]. For coastal areas, the observation and boundary
issues described, the dependency on an unpredictable environment, the
evolution of layers of actors and institutions associated with either land
or sea, add problems.
This tension between need for and obstacles for policy integration is a
feature of the coastal condition, partly underpinned by the other fea-
tures. The experiences with ICZM point in the same direction. Material
and other dependencies intertwine, make certain observations easier,
make at the same time forms of coordination harder. Coastal commu-
nities might be better able to observe the sea. They also are in a good
position to observe the compounded coastal effects of different activ-
ities (and policies governing them) on land, but are not in the best place
to grasp the interrelations between the land based activities, and cer-
tainly not to manage them. The argument for a delineation and gov-
ernance of the coastal still stands, but now is specified: coastal gov-
ernance has to observe in all directions, to grasp the interplay between
actions, between policies, on land, at sea, at the coast, which all effect
the coast. A high degree of coordination is thus required, a high degree
of policy integration, while the identities to be coordinated (actors in
and outside administrations) shall not and cannot be erased by the
process of governing together. The ICZM experiences highlight both the
difficulty of creating coastal governance entities and the difficulties to
come to real policy integration in such context. MSP is more ambitious
with policy integration, and its chances have to be doubted, at least
when the goals are taken literally.
The standard recommendation to prescribe policy integration [55],
in the form of a more comprehensive form of planning, conservation,
development, or more expertise-heavy governance procedures [4] is
thus on the one hand very rational for coastal conditions, and on the
other hand subjected to the particular pressures and complexities of the
coast. The reasons to delineate a coast (as line, boundary) are still there
and therewith the reasons to govern the land and the sea in their own
ways. The actors which have evolved to play a role in the governance of
land tend to be more numerous, powerful, and stabilised in their
identity than the ones associated with the sea. Coastal actors tend to be
absent from higher level governance, with the exception in some places
of large port cities and their lobbies, representing a narrow set of goals
which cannot be represented as the collective goals of the coastal
communities.
5.4. The coastal condition asks for coastal governance
For EGT, prior modes and sites of policy integration enable further
policy integration in that frame, and have to be explored first as pos-
sible arenas for and forms of new strategy formation, as places where
policy integration can be rejuvenated [56]. Not doing this, would create
a problem similar to that of direct import of policy solutions: they
would not be adapted neither to the governance system nor to the
ecological system, and therefore, in most cases they would not be able
to provide a sustainable governance solution [9].
To radically restructure policy integration it would have to be
linked to new and accepted governance arenas, their actors and in-
stitutions. ICZM taught that they cannot simply be mandated, and
certainly not by means of blanket rules [57]. The arguments for deli-
neating a coastal zone, as site of more complex observation and policy
integration, are strong, yet in EGT perspective will take time to be made
and remade. The more sensitive the actors arguing are for existing
governance configurations, the more likely there will be real impact
[58]. If coastal communities are not organised, if the coast as discursive
object is not widespread in society, if the coastal effects of many land
issues are not observed, the case for coastal governance is more difficult
to make in a particular governance context. Conversely, if the object is
there, if actors can align around the object, and a relatively decen-
tralised form of multi-level governance exists, chances are higher for it
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to come into existence [56].
The coastal condition in EGT perspective thus revolves around dif-
ferent patterns of dependencies, observational complexity, and multi-
plicity of boundaries, reinforcing each other into a need and a problem
for policy integration. The coastal condition requires a coastal form of
governance, associated with the coast as boundary zone, as impact
zone, as launching base. Processes of object and subject construction
can partly be steered, and shape the chances of what is possible for new
governance arenas. Similarly important is the context of multi-level
governance which allows for certain modifications, not others. Finally,
the governance path itself requires scrutiny, has to be a source of in-
spiration for any attempt at new adaptivity and sustainability [9].
If coastal communities are thus per definition adapted in a parti-
cular way to a particular coastal condition, if their diversity is a re-
flection of different positionalities and choices within such coastal
condition, one can nevertheless not claim that all communities are
perfectly adapted. Old phenomena intensified (tourism effects, agri-
cultural and industrial pollution), increased linkage between places
(globalisation), and new sources and forms of change (climate change,
sea level rise), as well as an increasing complexity of policy goals (e.g.
associated with intense multi-use situations) bring along new require-
ments for adaptation. New forms of adaptive governance are needed, in
other words, and it is known by now that these forms have to take into
account the coastal condition and the governance path. New reasons for
new forms of coordination arise, and, with them, new forms of ob-
servation and policy integration. In the next section, this overarching
issue will succinctly be analysed in terms of different existing gaps in
coastal governance, and possible ways forward, both observed through
the lens of EGT and our conceptual frame under construction.
6. New forms of adaptation to new and intensified governance
problems
Ports and other coastal towns learned from each other, and com-
peted avidly for ages, learning new techniques of navigation, ship-
building, fishing, trading, planning, yet, as with other places, not all
survived. Specialisation is always a risk, and a tight coupling with a
particular ecological system, too. Governance is always adaptive in the
sense that what is not adapted, perishes. The following paragraphs
distinguish between different sorts of gaps, associated with different
dimensions. Working on these gaps can, in our view, help to move
coastal governance towards sustainability. Adaptation is linked to
learning, response and observation.
6.1. Gaps in the 2 dimensional map
Globalisation and new technologies have made more parts of the
seas useful for someone [59]. While the system of nation states and
their seaward boundaries, and the weak state of international marine
treaties make it hard to coordinate action and response to unwanted
action [60]. Many parts of the open sea are harder to manage than
before, because there is more to manage, and because there are more
boundaries to observe for state actors. Other actors, especially illegiti-
mate ones, do not have that problem. So, de facto new gaps emerge in
the map of spaces that ought to be governed [61].
These are not coastal places, but for the coast, these gaps in ob-
servation and governance produce the most immediate effects. The le-
gitimate local activities will combine and compete on the high seas in
less predictable ways, and some will affect the activities closer to home
- fishing by more players far out, places more pressure on coastal
communities, and reveals more clearly existing governance gaps. It also
reveals the limits to previous observations of the resource, where ob-
servation of critical limits in the past was not possible but also not
necessary, while today it's still impossible but more and more needed.
The co-evolution of community, coast and sea thus becomes more
problematic, due to increased interdependencies [41].
6.2. Gaps in the 3rd dimension
The third dimension is of particular importance in the marine en-
vironment. The seafloor is a two dimensional space to be governed. Due
to new economic activities and new technological possibilities, actors
arise, who want to have privately assigned property rights. Wind or
wave power farms need governance securing their rights. Mariculture
has clear space requirements, but already moves clearly into the third
dimension, having strong implications on the water column. Fishing
rights, marine protected areas, or effluent discharges are all in parti-
cular relevant for the water column. Here fluidity becomes an im-
portant characteristic of marine governance: the columns and layers of
water can be home to different activities, which nevertheless affect each
other. Moreover, water moves, and neither columns nor layers are de-
lineated in a stable manner. Governance predicated upon stable spatial
boundaries in two dimensions misses thus the point, i.e., does not ob-
serve problems and opportunities [45].
New technologies and scarcities led to exploration of deeper water
and of the deep seafloor itself. Economic interests of the previously
disregarded deep sea emerge strongly. Most likely due to the lack of
economic interest, it was politically feasible that the deep ocean be-
came at least formally, with the help of the law of the sea, designated as
a common good, a joint heritage of human kind. However, in the 80 s,
when the convention was first issued many of the potential uses of the
deep sea resources could not be envisaged. Narratives regarding their
good governance remain underdeveloped. Now, formal institutions are
tested and fail [26]. New forms of governance have to emerge. This
might not be coastal governance itself, but these developments at sea
add to the reasons for new adaptation on the coast: what happens at sea
can end up at the coast (e.g. pollution from mining, drilling, effects of
killing), and, positively, the new activities most likely require a coastal
base, changing the balance of governance in coastal communities as
well (think of power relations around the Gulf of Mexico).
Gaps in the 2nd and 3rd dimension reinforce each other, and the
complex movements of water render the governance challenge even
harder. Similarly to the previous point, this is not a coastal matter
immediately, but a matter which affects coastal communities in their
livelihoods far more directly than any other place. The entwined gaps
create new opportunities for some coastal communities (benefiting
from loose regulation), have the potential to change the identity of
some, especially those coming first and close to a resource (as offshore
oil development did some decades ago), while increasing inequality and
unpredictability. One could say that the new governance gaps represent
a loss of adaptation between the international governance order and the
global marine environment as encompassing ecosystem. Or, the new
opportunities and risk map threatens to throw back the governance
system into an older, less developed state, meaning less capable of
managing complexity, less capable of promoting whatever common
good is observed [20].
6.3. Gaps in the 4th dimension
Coastal and marine ecosystems are notoriously hard to model, hard
to predict, and neither science (in its current state) nor local knowledge
(in its diversity), are capable of avoiding surprises. With the increased
effects of human activity in and on the sea, and the increased demands
on the sea (see above), new time horizons require observation and
governance. Observation is not easy, as the sea and its creatures re-
spond slow to many things, while even without human disturbance,
many ecological, biological and geo-chemical cycles are very slow and
complex, and influence each other through still unobserved feedback
loops [62].
New issues require new time horizons, and, as with the 2nd and 3rd
dimension, what remained unobserved and unproblematic can now be
observed and becomes problematic. Climate change adaptation is felt
most directly on the coast as a problem, and the new observations, the
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emergence of a picture, might occur later than the actual need for co-
ordination, for governance [63]. The current rising temperature of the
ocean is caused by emissions since the industrial revolution and would
have required a governance change long time ago. Even if governance
systems are abruptly changed now, trends will be reversed many dec-
ades later [64].
The previous governance configuration, a limited understanding or
the inability to measure might not have enabled the timely production
of narratives, expertise, and associated observation, to allow for timely
adaptation [65]. For EGT (following systems theory here), it is not only
that perfect adaptation of governance systems to social and ecological
systems is not possible, there is also a real risk of catastrophe, as one
can never know for sure whether the quality and timing of our ob-
servation and our capacity of coordination are in sync with changes in
the material environment [62]. Even if some of those changes are man-
made. In tightly coupled coastal communities, the effects are most
pressing.
Actors have their own time horizons, but so have institutions. And
the narratives, expertise, and ideologies used by and shaping actors and
institutions are affected by time in various ways: the cycles of change
reshaping them, the histories constructed by them, the time horizons
embraced by them. What is decided upon in governance, and the tools
constructed for coordination in and towards the future are per defini-
tion imperfect in this sense too: the time horizons and time effects in all
the participating actors, discourses, institutions, forms of knowledge,
can never be fully grasped, let alone coordinated, let alone matched to
imperfectly observed and non-linear phenomena in nature [57].
New stories can make a difference though. New stories can be
written, told, retold, performed, and old stories can be unveiled and
examined [23]. Discourses can find a place in new discursive coalitions.
New stories can lead to the emergence of new actors, of new institu-
tions, of new objects (the coast, climate change, fish stocks) of gov-
ernance [65]. EGT would add that, besides scrutiny of present/absent
visions for the future in governance, also the effects of old futures and
their time horizons on current governance require analysis - the goal
dependencies - similar to Jasanoff and Kim [66] and Beckert [67] in this
regard. Reconstructing goal dependencies can help to see how series of
previously imagined futures exert influence on the reproduction and
evolution of governance. This effort can assist in finding and filling gaps
in a discursive sense, but also in understanding how new versions of the
future could possibly have different effects on the self-transformation of
governance.
7. Conclusion
Coastal communities across the world face problems that current
governance systems cannot cope with easily. This paper argued that
understanding the coastal condition through the lens of evolutionary
governance theory (EGT) does not produce immediate answers to those
issues, but that it can help to reframe both the bigger issues and the
options available at the local level to coordinate action, to adapt gov-
ernance in new manners.
7.1. Governance for the coastal condition under new conditions
It was argued that, given the unique patterns of co-evolution in
coastal communities, the particular forms of coupling between social
and ecological systems and within social systems, they have been
adapted for a long time – since they had to. The materiality of the
ecosystem has been felt for a long time, very directly, but some of the
core material challenges arising (sealevel rise, cliff erosion, pro-
liferating plastic, dwindling stocks, changing temperatures) require
new forms of attention. Recent evolutions in the global socio-ecological
system have left the local coastal communities particularly vulnerable,
and having to rethink their mode of adaptation. New forms of
governance, new modes of observation, of coordination are needed, at
different scales.
The presence of the sea always made coastal communities places
adept at risk and opportunity calculation, and acute observation. They
invented forms of governance based on actors and institutions not
present elsewhere, relying on observation, knowledge, response capa-
city hard to grasp for outsiders. All these aspects of governance are
tested however by the new challenges, the material ones mentioned,
and challenges of globalisation, scarcity and technology. The same
environment, the same technological progress, and even the same
scarcity, however, can also be sources of inspiration and solutions.
What has to be rethought is the series of interconnected practices of
learning – observation – risk calculation – response – adaptation. If one
can see better, aided by EGT, how these linkages worked in a particular
governance path, how governance configurations enabled and disabled
forms of observation, of learning, of constructing futures (both desired
and feared), then it is easier to see how new governance configurations
can accommodate new forms of learning etc. The governance path also
shows mechanisms of self-transformation which come in handy
anyway, for whatever form of change one aspires to.
In a globalising context, still dominated by nation states, the diag-
nosed governance gaps can only be filled by analyses and strategic
thinking in multi-level governance. More and more issues are con-
nected, and solutions similarly have to take into account that con-
nectivity, and the relations and resources of different levels of gov-
ernance. Purely local solutions cannot exist. However, the local is
conspicuously absent from much strategising about changing coasts,
and so is the coast itself. That is, rarely, a form of governance exists
which represents ‘the coast’, as boundary zone, as place of linkages and
observation of linkages, as zone of potential boundary crossing, as zone
burdened by a particular layering of boundaries and particular forms of
escaping them.
From our reconstruction of the coastal condition through an EGT
lens, and the diagnosis of governance gaps, follows a strong argument
for a recognition of the coast as an object of governance, deserving a
site of governance. In that site of governance, an arena, policy in-
tegration is both more necessary and more difficult than for other areas.
Yet, not doing this makes the challenge even greater, makes the un-
observed impact of various overlapping boundaries and coupling even
more problematic.
7.2. ICZM, seen through EGT: points of attention for coastal governance
reform
The experiences with ICZM, which followed roughly the same rea-
soning, and our analysis of the coastal condition, show however a few
other things which EGT elucidates:
– New forms of governance (coastal governance) cannot disregard
existing forms and their evolutionary path
– New forms of policy integration (in coastal governance) cannot
disregard existing forms of policy integration
– If object formation (‘the coast’) is weak, governance around it is
likely weak
– Policy integration has to be flexible, to allow for adaptive govern-
ance
– Stories about the coast, about risk and opportunity, shape observa-
tion, calculation, governance
– New forms of coastal governance will require a balancing act be-
tween new and old modes of observation, forms of coordination
which will not disappear (pertaining to land, sea, coastal govern-
ance).
– New time horizons have to be introduced, and require re-examina-
tion and likely re-organization of the whole governance system in
steps.
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In other words, coastal governance in a delineated arena, and
multiplication of perspectives, stories, modes of observation in that
arena are highly desirable, as is their coordination and integration,
while it is at the same time extremely difficult, and also risky in itself –
as policy integration in a particular form introduces a rigidity, a limit to
new adaptations. Coastal governance is therefore very likely to be a
place of conflict, of necessary conflict. Understanding not only a mul-
tiplicity of interests and perspectives, but also an unpredictable en-
vironment, and the need for understanding land and sea as systems
requiring their own governance, has to rub against a perspective on the
coast as a boundary zone, an area with different observational possi-
bilities. This creates conflict, and avoiding such conflict can only be
detrimental in the long run. Coastal governance then appears as a
productive fiction, an essential one, as a site of productive conflict, just
as important.
8. Post-script: materiality and sustainability under the coastal
condition
Coastal communities have to engage with their material environ-
ment in a different way than most others. Following the evolutionary
theory of Maturana and Varela [62,68] this paper recognises that the
structure of a system does not follow entirely from an optimisation of its
function (an adaptation to the internal environment), nor from direct
adaptation to external environments, e.g. in terms of Darwinian adap-
tation or in terms of the carrying capacity concept from environmental
studies and evolutionary economics [63,69]. Community structures
(including its governance, enabling self-transformation of structures) do
not follow from either internal or external environment, although the
coast does show that material environments place constraints on and
co-determine the evolution of governance (compare [64,70]. Commu-
nities however do not know exactly how they are shaped by their en-
vironment [39,44], what the precise relation is between adaptation and
purposive goal setting, the balance between adaptation to internal and
external environments. Importantly, they are only partially aware (in
line with [20]) what extent their current functioning (including gov-
ernance) is shaped by adaptations to previous environments or states of
the environment. This applies all the more to individual actors, or or-
ganisations as actors, which have an even more partial perspective of
environmental and environmental imperatives than the collective of the
community, ideally embodied in its governance system.
Sustainability, following Valentinov [65,71] is jeopardised by some
of the same mechanisms of community formation and community
governance which evolved to deal with environmental complexity.
Societal complexity allows for more different responses to environ-
mental change, adaptations to more aspects of the environment, and the
aspect of cognitive complexity renders it possible to entertain different
options as scenarios, before choosing a course. Yet, this complexity
creates new blind spots, and therefore environmental risk. In addition,
the coupling of a multitude of social systems in complex society makes
them dependent on each other, thus shocks reverberate everywhere,
and larger changes towards environmental adaptation (and sustain-
ability) become harder to coordinate. Coastal communities affected by
globalised problems, become visible then as subjected to another, not
yet mentioned paradox: their particular internal complexity, evolved
out of a tight coupling with a material environment, favoured sus-
tainability under a range of conditions in the short to medium time
frame, yet outside that range, in environmental conditions and in time
horizon, the coastal condition made them less sustainable, and their
governance systems less able to deal with change.
The degree to which they have been incorporated in nation states, in
the realities of culture and governance, not on paper, and ‘normalised’
in the sense of incorporation into patterns of multi-level governance
reigning elsewhere in the state, can signify a measure of re-introduction
of broader perspectives, of other options for long term sustainability.
Yet, as was pointed out earlier, both complexity and adaptation come at
a cost. Simply erasing the specificity of the coastal condition (if at all
possible), reducing coastal communities to any other (if at all possible),
would generate as many sustainability problems as it portends to solve.
The tight coupling with the material environment served purposes.
Hence our argument, not against local governance nor against multi-
level governance, but for coastal forms of governance, coastal arenas of
decision-making which embody new couplings between social and
ecological systems, and new couplings between levels of governance.
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